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LA RESPONSABILITI DU CONSTRUCTEUR ET DU VENDEUR ...
THE LIABILITY OF THE BUILDER AND VENDOR OF HOUSES
PROTECTION OFFERED BY THE




Scope of the Problem
It is strikingly apparent that we live in a consumer conscious society. No longer
can it be said that the consumer is "regarded as an unorganized victim of the
mass-manufacturer, a person whose few existing legal rights were taken from him at
every turn by exclusion clauses galore." I However, this awareness as well as consumer
protection itself, have been related mainly to movable goods pruchased by the general
public. As Dworkin so aptly states:
Paradoxically, the most important purchase undertaken by the average consumer
in his lifetime, a house, has remained in many ways virtually unaffected by this
increased social responsibility.2
The importance of this statement is that the social significance of a house purchase to
the average person is much greater than the purchase of other domestic items such as
cookers, freezers or even cars. The purchase of a house involves a large sum of money
and most often a mortgage which will last for twenty years or so.
As Martini points out:
This is important when one considers that in 1973 there were 268,000 housing
units started in Ontario and that there have been over a million houses
constructed in Canada since 1970. In 1973 as well, over 2,280 Canadians
complained to the Consomer Affairs. Department about housing defects and this
ranks third on the complaints list behind food and motor vehicles. Thus, it comes
an no surprise that there has been a growing public concern that there is little
purchaser protection for the Canadian home buyer. 
3
* Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto.
G. DWORKIN, Consumer Protection and the Problems of Substandard New Houses, (1964) 23 Conv. and
Prop. Law. (N.S.) 276.
2 Ibid.
3 S.P. MARTINI, "Defective Construction of New Homes", (1974) 22 Chitty's L.J. 269.
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This paper is devoted to a brief discussion of the problems affecting a purchaser of real
property who finds it necessary to make repairs to his property, or who is physically
injured by some of its defects.
It is necessary to define the relevant perimeters. Although both "old" and
"new" houses are to be considered, most problems arise in connection with new
houses.
In order to explain the position of the purchaser of a home, one must look at the
protection afforded to him by legal and extra-legal means.
This study will consider the liability of the builder-vendor in tort and in contract.
It will not deal with the protection given to the purchaser by the HUDAC program, as
this topic is considered in detail by another participant in this conference.
This paper will attempt to outline the law as it exists in Ontario. By comparing it
with that of the other jurisdictions analyzed at this conference, there may appear ways of
surmounting the difficulties to be encountered by purchasers.
2. The Common Law Protection Afforded to a Purchaser
a) Liability in Tort
Contractual rights may be inadequate both from a practical and legal point of
view. Furthermore, since any rights which do exist are solely of benefit to the parties to
the contract, it is important to determine what remedies a person may have for damage
suffered as a result of a defective building when he is not a party to the contract of sale.
It is generally agreed that the law in this area does not impose adequate responsibilities
on developers.
(i) Vendors
At the outset, it must be realized that the position of a vendor of an old house is
a protected one. By parting with the title and possession of the property his control over
it ceases and he is generally released from liability for personal injuries caused by
defects in the property. The maxim caveat emptor applies. The risk of quality lies upon
the purchaser.
This principle was first applied to leases and is stated by Erle C.J. in Robbins v.
Jones as follows:
A landlord who lets a house in a dangerous state is not liable to the tenant's
customers or guests for accidents happening during the term: for, fraud apart,
there is no law against letting a tumbledown house: and the tenant's remedy is
upon his contract, if any.4
No doubt the practice of having a survey or inspection was the justification for this rule.
Later on this principle was extended to sales of realty. s
Contract and fraud apart, the vendor is not under a duty to protect the buyer from
any defects of the premises even if they existed at the time of the sale. There is no
4 (1863) 15 C.B. (N.S.) 221, 143 E.R. 768, at p. 776 (C.P.). This dictum was accepted by the House of
Lords in Cavalier v. Pope, [19061 A.C. 428.
Bottomley v. Bannister, [1932] 1 R.B. 458 (C.A.).
LA RESPONSABILITt DU CONSTRUCTEUR ET DU VENDEUR ...
implied warranty of fitness for human habitation in an old house or even in a new house
which has been purchased after the construction has ended.
In Bottomley v. Bannister,6 a house on a building estate was sold. The purchaser
and his wife took possession before completion and were found dead a month later,
having been gassed by a defective gas boiler. The English Court of Appeal held that
even if the defect were due to the negligence of the builder-vendor, and this was not
clearly established, there was no liability. Lord Justice Scrutton stated that:
It is at present well established law that in the absence of express contract, a
landlord of an unfurnished house is not liable to his tenant or a vendor . . . to
his purchaser for defects in the house or land rendering it dangerous or unfit for
occupation even if he constructed the defects himself or is aware of their
existence. 7
The distinguishing factor that there was a landlord-tenant relationship was considered
immaterial by the court, and the immunity from liability was held to cover builders
selling property. This decision has been criticized on the ground that Lord Justice
Scrutton's views were obiter as the plaintiff had failed to establish negligence,
8 and also
because the court's decision was rendered before the House of Lords decided Donoghue
v. Stevenson9 where a general duty of care in unegligence was established. Lord Atkin
stated in Donoghue v. Stevenson:
a manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he
intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him
with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the
knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up
of the product will result in an injury to the consumer's life or property, owes a
duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care . . . 10
His Lordship referred" to Bottomley v. Bannister12 and merely said that the case was
decided on the grounds that the boiler was part of the realty and that the vendor
3 did
not know of the dangerous situation.
This would appear to place a limitation on Scrutton L.J.'s earlier statement,'
4
but only as regards knowledge on the part of the vendor. He did not suggest that his
"good neighbour" principle be extended to real property. Lord Atkin's principle has
been applied to "virtually every type of product under the sun","
5 but in Canada until
Lock v. Stibor'6 was decided in 1962, it was confined to chattels and did not extend to
realty.' 7 It was an anomalous situation that even "certain chattels, when incorporated
6 Ibid.
7 Id., at p. 468.
8 This viewpoint is, however, rather a pedantic one. It could be argued to the contrary that Donoghue v.
Stevenson is a case which is concerned solely with its own factual situation and that Lord Atkin's views as
to a general test of foreseeability are not applicable to other fact patterns.
9 [1932] A.C. 562.
10 Id., at p. 569.
' 'Id., at p. 570 .
12 Supra, note 5.
13 Lord Atkin used the term "'landlord."
"4 Supra, note 5, at p 468.
15 A.M. LINDEN, ed., "Products Liability in Canada", in Studies in Canadian Tort Law, Butterworth,
Toronto, 1968, 612 p., p. 220.
16 (1962) 34 D.L.R. (2d) 704 (Ont. H.C.). See discussion infra, pp. 8-9.
'7 Malone v. Laskey, [1907] 2 K.B. 141 (C.A.); Bottomley v. Bannister, supra, note 5; Otte v. Boton and
Norris, [19361 2 K.B. 46. (C.A.).
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into real property, might be treated as such for some legal purposes". ' 8 Thus, a vendor
would still be exempted from liability "if a product went into the house as a chattel but
then was affixed to the realty. As such the vendor was not liable even if the fixtures
were defective and sold unattached from the realty".19
In Otto v. Bolton and Norris,20 the English Court of Appeal had to decide
whether Bottomley v. Bannister21 and other old cases had been over-ruled by Donoghue
v. Stevenson.22 The court held that they had not. The defendants, who had sold a
partially constructed house to the plaintiff Miss Otto, were held not to be liable for
injury caused to her mother when the ceiling collapsed. 23 The court reaffirmed the
theory of caveat emptor in all its glory!
Bottomley v. Bannister24 had survived Donoghue25 and was still good law. The
court stated that "[i]t is settled law that a vendor of a house, even if also the builder of
it, gives no implied warranty as to its safety". 26 Donoghue v. Stevenson 27 was held to
have no application to the case. Atkinson J., stated:
That was a case dealing with chattels, and there is not a word in the case from
beginning to end which indicates that the law relating to the building and sale of
houses is the same as that relating to the manufacture and sale of chattels.
28
Similar decisions were also reached in Travers v. Gloucester Corporation29 and Davis
v. Foots. 3
0
It must be noted, however, that in all three cases the defect was patent and the
purchasers or tenants had a reasonable opportunity to examine the property. A
distinction between latent and patent defects may well be the answer to the problems
created by the case law.
3
In Johnson v. Summers,3 2 three years after Otto v. Bolton and Norris33 had been
decided, the Manitoba Court of Appeal held that it was not bound by that decision.
Adamson J.A. refused to grant recovery to a housemaid who had been injured when a
hot water radiator weighing approximately four hundred points fell from the wall and
struck her because she could not show that the defendants method of installation was the
cause of the injury. However, he felt thet Donoghue v. Stevenson was a case whose
principles were of general application and went on to state a prophetic obiter dictum:
1s S.M. WADDAMS, Products Liability, Toronto, Carswell, 1974, 250 p., p. 25.
19 R.E. CARR, "Latent Defects in New Houses: Who Pays?", (1971) 29 U. of T.L. Fac. Rev. 84, at p. 93.
20 Supra, note 1.
21 Supra, note 5.
22 Supra, note 9.
23 The purchaser, Miss Otto, had a remedy in contract for the repair of the ceiling, based on the warranty of
fitness.
24 Supra, note 5.
25 Supra, note 9.
26 Supra, note 17, at p. 52.
27 Supra, note 9.
28 Supra, note 17, at pp. 54-55.
29 [19471 K.B. 71.
30 [1940] 1 K.B. 116.
3' DWORKIN, op. cit., note 1, at p. 292.
32 [1939] 2 D.L.R. 665 (Man. C.A.).
33 Supra, note 17.
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I can see no reason why the legal liability for negligently erecting a heavy fixture
in a cottage should be different from negligently erecting a similar fixture in a
railway coach or in a large motor bus. There is no principle upon which such a
distinction can be made. 34
Lock v. Stibor3" is generally considered as having eliminated the distinction
between chattels and realty. The plaintiffs were paying a social call to the house which
the purchaser had bought from the builder-vendor. The female plaintiff was injured
when a kitchen cabinet fell from the wall, striking and injuring her. The Ontario High
Court held that the manner in which the cabinet was installed created a foreseeable risk
that it would fall, and that the danger was latent. Richardson J. was of the opinion that
Mr. Justice Atkinson in Otto v. Bolton and Norris36 had not said that Donoghue v.
Stevenson3 7 does not apply to realty as well as to chattels.3 8 He felt that the cabinet was
a hidden danger and distinguished Otto v. Bolton and Norris,39 because the defects were
plainly to be seen in Otto, whereas in the case he was considering, the defect was latent
and therefor the ordinary principles of negligence applied. He stated:
It is said that the alleged grounds for the distinction between realty and chattel
seems to be the suggestion that there is always opportunity for inspection and
possibility of discovery of a defect in realty whereas that is not always so with a
chattel. This, in my opinion, is not the case because if that is the ground for the
distinction, how could a layman be expected to inspect the brakes of his
automobile after they had been repaired by a garageman?
In the case at bar no inspection after the cabinet was erected could have
disclosed to anybody the defective workmanship. This work was negligently done
by the workmen of the corporate defendants who knew or should have known
that visitors would come upon the premises and into the kitchen and I think they
owed a duty to them not to expose such people to this danger.4 °
Thus, the builder-vendor was held to be liable.
This case demonstrates that even if the rule of caveat emptor is so firmly
entrenched into our legal system that it cannot be eradicated, it should only apply to
patent defects. When a defect is latent, a duty of care should be places on the vendor to
disclose or remedy the defect.
There is certainly logic in this view. If the court in Lock4 1 had not come to this
conclusion, distinguished Otto v. Bolton and Norris,42 and Bottomley v. Bannister
43 and
applied Donoghue v. Stevenson,
44 the plaintiffs would have been unable to recover.
4
34 Supra, note 32, at p. 667.
35 Supra, note 16.
36 Supra, note 17.
37 Supra, note 9.
38 Supra, note 16, at p. 708.
39 Supra, note 17.
40 Supra, note 16, pp. 709-710.
41 Supra, note 16.
42 Supra, note 17.
43 Ibid.
44 Supra, note 9.
45 Even if the implied warranty "scheme" had been used as the house was uncompleted at the time of the
transaction, only the purchaser would have had the benefit of it. It would have remained, however, for the
plaintiffs to have sought compensation for their injuries from the Stibors under occupiers liability, the
Locks, being able to seek an indemnity from the vendor under the warranty. See discussion on implied
warranty, infra, pp. 19 et seq., and DWORKIN, op. cit., note 1, at p. 296.
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The vendor's immunity is incompatible with the principles enunciated in
Donoghue v. Stevenson4 6 and its survival can be attributed to deference to an entrenched
anomaly.
It has been suggested that if no one had sued in tort for personal injuries arising
from a defective house until after Lord Atkin's principle had been expounded in 1932,
there would have been liability4 7 on the basis of foreseeability, the injured purchaser or
guest being a "neighbour. "48
As Salmond points out 49 the immunity of the vender must be regarded as an
exception to the general principle of Donoghue v. Stevenson.5 0 It is "a rock which has
escaped the flood tide of liability released [by that case].""
(ii) Builders
It is quite clear that the builder has no immunity in tort and that the ordinary
principles of negligence apply. The industry has always insured against this risk.
In A.C. Billings and Sons v. Riden ,52 builders who had been employed to
reconstruct the approach to a house, left it in a dangerous condition. As a result a
woman who was visiting the house was injured when she tried to leave. The House of
Lords held that the builders were:
[U]nder a duty to all persons who might be expected to visit the house and that
duty was the ordinary duty to take care as, in all the circumstances of the case,
was reasonable to ensure that visitors were not exposed to danger by their
actions. 
5 3
In Clay v. A.J. Crump and Sons Ltd. ,14 the building contractors, demolition
contractors and the supervising architect were made liable for negligence in leaving a
dangerous wall standing during work of redevelopment. On the same principle, in
Sharpe v. E.T. Sweeting and Son Ltd.,5- and Gallagher v. McDowell Ltd. ,56 builders
who were not the vendors but were building under contract with the landowner, have
been held liable to third persons for injuries caused by negligent work.
The courts only considered the question of liability when the builder was the
contractor and not the vendor. It was assumed that Bottomley v. Bannister17 was still
good authority where the builder was also the vendor, and thus would be exempted from
46 Supra, note 9.
41 WINFIELD, note on Otto v. Bolton and Norris, (1936) 52 L.Q.R. 313.
41 Ibid. Note Lord Denning's comments inDutton v. Bognor Regis U.D.C., [1972] 1 Q.B. 373 (C.A.), at pp.
392-394, and Sachs L.J.'s finding that Bottomley v. Bannister, supra, note 5, had not survived Donoghue
v. Stevenson, supra, note 9.
41 Salmond on Torts, (17th ed.,) by R.V. HEUSTON, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1977, 740 p., p. 293.
so Supra, note 9.
sI Supra, note 49.
52 [1958] A.C. 240 (H.L.).
'3 Id., at p. 250.
54 [1964] 1 Q.B. 533 (C.A.).
55 [1963] 2 All E.R. 455 (York Assizes).
56 [1961] N.I. 26. (C.A.N.I.).
17 Supra, note 5.
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liability for negligence. Lord MacDermott C.J. in Gallagher 8 stated that the question of
immunity was a question of policy. His answer to the problem of whether the extension
of the principle of Donoghue v. Stevenson59 to building contractors would lead to some
mischief that would justify its rejection was straightforward:
The attitude that any enlargement of the field of tortious liability is always to be
regarded as a step in the right direction is not one to be commended. Some gap
between morality and law is inevitable and, if the gap is not too large, may be
for the benefit of both codes. On the other hand the changes to be expected in a
progressive society call, from time to time, for such adjustment in the domain of
legal responsibility as will promote justice and fair dealing. Those are terms
which may mean different things in different epochs, but from the point of view
of what is generally regarded as just and fair today I see no reason why a
responsibility similar to that of the manufacturers and repairers of chattels
should not fall upon the builders of houses, or why, if it does so fall, harm to
trade or commerce or some other important facet of the life of the community
should be apprehended. The immunities of the landowner seem to me to
strengthen rather than weaken these conclusions. 
60
Likewise Mr. Justice Nield in Sharpe v. Sweeting 6' rejected the argument that a
building contractor had immunity. He said:
The fact that the owner is also the builder does not remove the owner's
immunity, but when the builder is not the owner he enjoys no such immunity. 
62
It appears that the immunity of the vendor will cover his servants or agents who carry
out construction - but not independant contractors. 63 This, leads one to conclude that
immunity depends upon the contractual relationship between the vendor and the
builders. Obviously, these distinctions are quite capricious!
(iii) Builder- Vendors
As already noted in Sharpe v. Sweeting 64 and Gallagher v. McDowell, 65 the
view was clearly expressed that a builder who is also a vendor will not be liable. Such
view is indefensible as it is unreasonable and illogical. Why should a builder-vendor
escape liability when he is the vendor, whereas if he were solely the builder he would be
liable? This illogical approach has not escaped Lord Denning's criticism. Thus, in
Dutton v. Bognor Regis Urban District Council66 the purchaser, bought a house from a
person who had purchased it from the first defendant a building company. The District
Council, which was the second defendant had passed the plans, even though the
property was built on a rubbish tip. In 1961 the walls and ceiling cracked, the staircase
slipped and the plaintiff became alarmed. She brought an action against the builders and
the Council. Later on she settled her claim with the vendor-builders so that the Council
became the only effective defendant.
58 Supra, note 56.
59 Supra, note 9.
60 Id., at p. 44.
61 Supra, note 55.
62 Id., at p. 463.
63 DWORKIN, op. cit., note 1, at p. 295.
64 Supra, note 55.
65 Supra, note 56.
66 Supra, note 48.
(1977) 12 R.J.T. No 3
The majority of the Court of Appeal held that Otto v. Bolton and Norris67 and
Bottomley v. Bannister6 8 should not be followed. Lord Denning stated that he agreed
that if the builder-vendor was not liable, neither should the Council be liable. Therefore,
he considered whether or not the builder-vendor was liable. He was of the opinion that
although Bottomley v. Bannister69 supports the positions of immunity, it can no longer
be considered as good law. He felt that there was no sensible distinction to be drawn
between builders who do not enjoy immunity as shown in Gallagher
70 and Sweering72
and a speculative builder who is fortunate enough to buy land and build houses himself
for sale. Lord Denning's reasons as indicative of a future trend are important and must
be quoted here:
There is no sense in maintaining this distinction. It would mean that a contractor
who builds a house on another's land is liable for negligence in constructing it,
but that a speculative builder, who buys land and himself builds houses on it for
sale, and is just as negligent as the contractor, in not liable. That cannot be
right. Each must be under the same duty of care and to the same persons. If a
visitor in injured by the negligent construction, the injured person is entitled to
sue the builder, alleging that he built the house negligently. The builder cannot
defend himself by saying: "True I was the builder; but I am the owner as well.
So I am not liable." The injured person can reply: "I do not care whether you
were the owner or not, I am suing you in your capacity as builder and that is
enough to make you liable."
We had a similar problem some years ago. The liability of a contractor doing
work on land was said to be different from the liability of an occupier doing the
selfsame work. We held that each was liable for negligence; see Billings (A.C.)
& Sons v. Riden, [19571 1 Q.B. 46, and our decision was upheld by the House
of Lords: [1958] A.C. 240; see also Miller v. South of Scotland Electricity
Board, [1958] S.C. 20, 37-38.
I hold, therefore, that a builder is liable for negligence in constructing a house
- whereby a visitor is injured - and it is no excuse for him to say that be was
the owner of it. In my opinion Bottomley v. Bannister, [19321 1 K.B. 458 is no
longer authority. Nor is Otto v. Bolton & Norris, (1936] 2 K.B. 46. They are
both overruled.
72
Lord Denning's views7 3 would appear to extend beyond the builder-vendor
situation to that of the pure vendor. However, it has been submitted that any plaintiff
who relies on Dutton might face grave problems, in the light of the "commonly
understood doctrine of precedent in the Court of Appeal", 74 since Bottomley v.
Bannister7 - is a decision of the Court of Appeal that was not overruled by the House of
Lords in Donoghue v. Stevenson.
76
67 Supra, note 17.
68 Supra, note 5.
69 Ibid.
70 Supra, note 56.
71 Supra, note 55.
72 Supra, note 48, at pp. 393-394.
13 SACHS L.J. also held id., at pp. 401-402, that Bottomley v. Bannister, supra, note 5, had not survived
Donoghue v. Stevenson, supra, note 9.
74 W.Y.H. ROGERS, Winfield on Tort (9th ed.,), Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1975, 672 p., p. 199.
75 Supra, note 5.
76 Supra, note 9.
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Also, it must be pointed out that the builder-vendor was not a party to the case as
the plaintiff settled and, thus, what was said was obiter. This anomalous situation has
long been criticized. For instance, Fleming is of the opinion that:
It would be. indefensibly esoteric to condone a distinction which would hold a
builder responsible for negligence in the execution of a construction contract,
but excuse the speculative builder who has capital and foresight enough to
confine himself to the sale of completed buildings. To do so would be for the law
to abrogate all function in raising the standard of an industry with notoriously
lax standards of efficiency and safety. Surely vendors no more than lessors (and
builders), have any claim founded in history or reason to exemption from the toll
which modern law exacts from all whose negligent activities expose their fellow
men to unreasonable risk of physical injury. 77
It is yet to be seen whether Lord Denning's and Lord Justice Sachs' views will be taken
heed of.
The role of policy must be recognized. As Lord Denning mused: "It seems to
me that it is a question of policy we, as judges, have to decide. The time has come when
in cases of new import, we should decide them according to the reason of the thing."
7 8
It is hoped that for the sake of logic, and fairness to the purchaser, and also to his family
and guests, taht future courts will decide according to reason and not just base their
decision on this entrenched anomaly.
(b) Liability in Contract for Defects of Quality
It is an obvious conclusion that in any discussion of remedies in contract, the
rights and duties of the parties will naturally depend upon the express terms of the
contract.
79
The physical nature of the property may be made the subject of representations
by the vendor to the purchaser. If this is so, these representations will determine the
obligations under the rules of contract. 8
This idea gives vent to the theory of freedom of contract but as stated at the
outset of this paper, the rule of "freedom" can be said to be not entirely free of
suspicion in this area where mass-developers are dealing with individual puchasers on a
"take-it or leave-it" basis.
The purchaser is certainly not on an equal footing with the developer. The trend
is to have a standard form contract which provides only the warranties that the developer
is prepared to give. Usually the developer will provide as little as possible.
It has been said that:
[D]ue to disparity in the bargaining power between the purchaser and the seller
or simply due to the buyer's lack of sophistication, there may be nothing said as
to protection against damage for any period after the transaction is closed. Even
7 J.G. FLEMING, The Law of Torts, 4th ed., Law Book, Sydney, 1971, p. 418. This author in his 5th ed.,
1977, states at p. 477 that vendor-builders are now liable for defects that they themselves have negligently
created, as their immunity appears to have been laid to rest by Dutton. It is suggested that the burial is far
from apparent.
78 Supra, note 48, p. 397.
79 DWORKIN, op. cit., note 1, at p. 277.
80 CARR, op. cit., note 19, at p. 84.
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if the buyer thinks to ask for warranties against physical defects, unless he is
well-advised, he most likely will inadequately protect himself. Very few
purchasers are aware of the state of the law and are knowledgeable of the fact
that the law will only protect them to the extent of the conditions they have
negotiated with the developer. Unless legal advice is obtained prior to the
purchase the layman buyer will not think to extract adequate warranties of
fitness from the builder-vendor.
Where a buyer has asked for no guarantees and the builder has made no
representations, the buyer must turn to the common law for his remedy if his
house is in need of repair. Unfortunately he will find that law wholly inadequate
for his purposes. 8
Is there implied warranty of fitness from the fact that the vendor is also the builder?
In answering this question it is necessary to note that Canada has followed the
English authorities, which originally, as in tort law, dealt with leases. It was held that
where an old house is bought or even a new hous which is completed at the time of the
contract, that property could be used for a number of purposes and the courts will not
imply a term that the house is fit for human habitation and the materials are reasonably
adequate for the purpose for which they are required. However, where the house is
uncompleted at the time of the contract and the vendor-builder agrees to complete it,
then a warranty is implied that it will be properly built, including the part that is already
completed at the time of sale. The courts have held that such a purchaser can only wish
to live in the house once it has been completed.
This was clearly stated by Swift J., although obiter, in Miller v. Cannon Hill
Estates Ltd. :82
It is quite clear law that if one buys an unfurnished house, there is no
implication of law and there is no implied contract that the house is necessarily
fit for human habitation. That must be good sense, because a man who buys an
empty house may not necessarily need it as a dwelling-house; he may be buying
something which is almost in a state of ruin, knowing that he will have to restore
it and pay a considerable amount of money for restoring it . . . The position is
quite different when you contract with a builder or the owners of a building
estate in course of development that they shall build a house for you or that you
shall buy a house which is then in the course of erection by them. There the
whole object, as both parties know, is that there shall be erected a house in
which the intended purchaser shall come to live. It is the very nature and essence
of the transaction between the parties that he will have a house put up there
which is fit for him to come into as a dwelling-house. It is plain that in those
circonstances there is an implication of law that the house shall be reasonably fit
for the purpose for which it is required, that is for human dwelling. 
8 3
In Perry v. Sharon Development Co. Ltd. ,84 the English Court of Appeal established a
rule of law based on the statements of Mr. Justice Swift in Miller. 85 The plaintiff had
purchased an uncompleted home and when he went into occupation there were many
problems. The court held that:
81 Id., at pp. 84-85.
92 [193112 K.B. 113.
83 Id., at pp. 120-121. The comments were, however, obiter, as the jury found in that case that there was an
express warranty in the contract and based the liability of the defendant on it.
84 [1937] 4 All E.R. 390 (C.A.).
8s Supra, note 82.
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• . . a vendor of a completed house, in respect of which there is no work g,,ing
on and no work to be done, does not in the absence of some express bargain,
undertake any obligation with regard to the condition of that house.
Indeed, the reason for that is obvious. Every contract must, of course, be
construed with reference to the subject matter with which it is dealing, and,
where a contract for the sale and purchase of a house is dealing with a house
which is in the contemplation of both parties, and to the knowledge of both
parties, supposed to be a completed house, there is no room for the implication
of any term as to the doing of further work upon it. But it seems to me that,
where the contract is a contract relating to a house which is still in the process
of being completed . . and particularly where the completion is not to take
place until the house has arrived at the contemplated condition - namely,
complete finish and readiness for occupation - there must be implied in that
contract an undertaking that the house shall be in that condition. 
8 6
Lord Justice MacKinnon did not base his reasons for the implied warranty on the
purchaser's use of the premises, but rather on the difficulties of inspection as to the
uncompleted portion.
Thus, if the house is incomplete or to be completed, the courts will imply a
condition that the work will be done efficiently, that the proper materials will be used,
and that the house will be fit for human habitation. Caveat emptor does not apply here.
Naturally, these implied conditions or warranties may be excluded by contract.
This may be done expressly or by particular specification, which tend to eliminate their
implication. For example, a builder may comply with the specifications agreed to by the.
purchaser which result in the house being unfit for human habitation. In such a case, the
purchaser will be deprived of the benefits of the impiled warranty.
The distinction to be drawn between uncompleted and completed houses is yet
another area of non-occupiers liability which can be called capricious. One writer
suggests that it is "magical, if not totally absurd today".
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It does not seem equitable that the buyer of a completed house will be found not
to have the benefit of implied warranties because supposedly he may not desire to live in
the house and has a greater chance to inspect and discover defects, whereas the
purchaser of the uncompleted house receives the implied warranties. The arbitrariness
and absurdity lie in the dividing line between completed and uncompleted houses. This
is the key factor since the purchaser's rights under the contract depend upon this
distinction. However, the Courts have tended to look favourably on the purchaser and
have found a house uncompleted on sometimes tenuous grounds. The purchaser will be
allowed the benefit of an implied warranty as long as the Court can make out a case that
some work, never mind how minute, remains to be done at the time of purchase. In
Croft v. Prendergast,8 8 the Court strained to find some work that remained to be done
to the house. It also held that the implied warranty extended to work already done, as
well as work left to be done.
8 9
86 Supra, note 84, at pp. 392-393.
87 MARTINI, op. cit., note 3, at p. 271.
8s [194912 D.L.R. 708 (Ont. C.A.).
89 It is suggested that this destroys the reason behind allowing an implied warranty for an uncompleted house
and not one for a completed house, as the basic assumption concerning the uncompleted part is
impossibility to inspect. If the buyer is allowed an implied warranty also for the completed part this
suggests incongruity. See LOKASH, "House Purchasers Protection - The Need for Reform", (1966) 24
U. of T., Fac. of L.R. 20, at p. 22.
(1977) 12 R.JT. No 3
The paradoxical situation may arise that a purchaser may benefit from an implied
warranty if he buys a house, for example, three days earlier than another purchaser of a
property in a similar stage, merely because something was left to be completed at that
time.
In summary, when a new house is completed, the buyer is in the same position
as the purchaser of an old house and caveat emptor applies. He must take the premises
as they stand even though there may be defects present unless he has an express term in
his contract. The purchaser of the uncompleted house, on the other hand, has the benefit
of the implied warranty and is protected against defects. It must one again be
remembered that privity of contract applies and that third parties may not recover under
a warranty which is express or implied.
c) Reform
The possible solutions for beneficial reform in the area of tort and contract are
obvious. In the tort field, the situation calls for an extension of liability to the vendor
and vendor-builder as has been suggested in Dutton v. Bognor Regis Urban District
Council.90 In contract, the solution would appear to be to extend the implied warranty
scheme to all new houses both completed and uncompleted as this would stop the
farcical attempt to find some remaining work to be done.
90 Supra, note 48.
